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Abstract 
The study on which this article is based, aimed to map out and analyse the 
ways in which Sweden’s Gripen exports have been shaped and sustained since the 
end of the Cold War. It did so by examining three interrelated factors that have had 
an effect on Sweden’s defence industry. By illustrating how societal preferences, 
defence and security policy shifts, and the role of national identity have influenced 
weapons manufacturing and exports, this article provides a balanced overview of the 
most salient push and pull factors of Sweden’s Gripen exports. The central 
contention of the study was that Swedish weapons manufacturing and exports often 
involve a close interaction between interests and ideals. Moreover, due to the 
multitude of richly correlated, interconnected and mutually reinforcing elements 
related to such practices, there cannot be a neat and parsimonious distinction 
between agents and structures and domestic and international settings. Instead, the 
study was especially reflective of real-world practices and the strategic relational 
approach between those forces that shape and sustain Sweden’s Gripen exports.  
Introduction 
Sweden’s SAAB-manufactured 2  JAS 3  Gripen fighter exports have 
witnessed considerable success in one of the world’s most competitive and 
sophisticated markets. Deals with South Africa, the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Thailand and Brazil – as well as potential deals with other nations4 – have illustrated 
that the Gripen is a powerful global contender. 5  However, unlike most major 
weapons exporters of advanced fighter jets, 
Sweden is a small country in Northern 
Europe with a strong tradition of neutrality 
and military non-alignment that lacks 
relative material power in the international 
domain. It has also not been at war with 
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another state since 1814, marking one of the longest uninterrupted periods of peace 
experienced by any nation in the world. 6  Given these aspects, how can we 
understand Sweden’s Gripen exports?  
The development, production and export of a product such as the Gripen are, 
after all, no ordinary undertaking. It is a comprehensive national commitment that 
requires, amongst other things, “extensive industrial inputs from such sectors as 
steel, metallurgy, machinery, and electronics”, 7  innovative research and 
development (R&D), and state intervention and market facilitation. The incremental 
development of this national system has become extremely well integrated into 
Swedish society in political, economic and technological terms and the decision-
making structures that underlie such a system.8 To this, we may add that such a 
national system has also become ideologically embedded within society through the 
preference shaping of societal and state actors. 
By taking into consideration the various push and pull factors that have 
influenced Sweden’s weapons exports, the study on which this article reports, aimed 
to understand the forces that have shaped and sustained Sweden’s impetus and 
capacity to produce and export the Gripen. To that end, the study examined three 
interrelated factors: societal preferences, domestic policy shifts vis-à-vis defence and 
security, and the role that national identity plays in Sweden’s weapons exports. The 
empirical findings are based on elite interviews and archival work that was 
conducted between September 2012 and May 2016 as well secondary literature on 
Swedish foreign policy and arms trade.  
The article proceeds as follows: first, I examine the configuration and 
variation of societal preferences vis-à-vis weapons manufacturing and exports, and 
how these preferences are aggregated through the domestic political system. Such a 
discussion opens up the black box of the state and it reveals who the domestic 
winners are from the production and trade in weapons such as the Gripen. I then 
outline some of the main changes in Swedish defence and security policies and 
practices since the end of the Cold War. These changes, it is argued, have had a 
salient effect on the Gripen programme. Moreover, this section illustrates the 
important role that the state plays in market facilitation and commercialisation of the 
Gripen. In the following section, attention is turned to the paradoxical yet effective 
role that national identity plays in Swedish weapons manufacturing and exports and 
how the Gripen occupies a special albeit dual role in this setting.  
Societal preferences 
In the Swedish political system, societal actors, such as industry and trade 
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unions, have assumed an important role in championing R&D, manufacturing and 
export of defence material. These societal actors have traditionally pressured 
government to act in the interest of their shareholders and constituents respectively.9 
The private economic and political interests of these societal actors are transmitted 
to the state through various representative platforms that often privilege some voices 
over others.  
Industry preferences 
The defence industry in Sweden generally behaves in a strategic manner in 
order to benefit private gain. Maximising profits often surpasses the need to seek 
other social goals. Profits mean that the defence industry can compete internationally 
and remain important domestically. A director at Sweden’s Security and Defence 
Industry Association (SOFF), succinctly explains the defence industry’s preferences 
in this regard:  
The defence industry, similar to other industries in Sweden, is heavily 
focused of market access. Without exports the Swedish defence industry will 
not survive. Seventy per cent of Swedish produced arms are exported. You 
must understand that exports are not only politically strategic they also have 
a common sense economic logic of selling to make profit and survive. At the 
end of the day, the defence industry goes where the money is just like any 
other business.10 
To succeed, the defence industry places significant pressure on government 
to act in their interests. As Former Minister of Defence, Björn von Sydow, notes, 
“companies such as SAAB are all the time [sic] demanding action or demanding 
answers from government. They are constantly demanding yes or no from the 
government for exports and international collaboration”.11 Former Prime Minister, 
Ingvar Carlsson, concurs with such an assessment and argues, “companies like 
SAAB have always placed extreme pressure on the government. They take this 
position, which is that they must be allowed to export to countries and the 
government must make that a reality”.12  
The preferences of the defence industry are similar to those put forward by 
Sweden’s large industrial base. That is because these sectors are not separate entities 
per se. Since the 1940s, industrial giants such as Volvo, Scania, SAAB, Electrolux 
and Ericsson – normally associated with the manufacturing of cars, trucks, 
microwave ovens and telecommunications (amongst other things) – have produced 
defence components. Economic interdependence in this instance has thus meant that 
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there is a parallel impetus for market access to export Swedish-made defence 
material. 
Trade union preferences  
In conjunction with the defence industry and industrial base that pressures 
government for favourable policies vis-à-vis arms manufacturing and export, trade 
unions have played an equally important role. Trade unions act in the interests of 
their constituents, that is, the workers employed in the defence industry. Any 
analysis of the Swedish defence industry that overlooks the central role that trade 
unions have played is essentially incomplete. As Björn von Sydow remarked, “trade 
unions, specifically those that organise defence industry employees, are very 
important for a model that explains why the defence industry operates the way it 
does and why it has the type of interests it does”.13 The most powerful and politically 
influential trade union with a vested interest in the defence sector is IF Metall (IFM). 
With an estimated 320 000 blue-collar workers, IFM is one of the largest trade unions 
within the private sector in Sweden. It is responsible for workers in 11 600 
workplaces and most workers in the defence industry are represented by IFM.14 
IFM has two core objectives: high employment, and good working 
conditions for its members. For these two objectives to be realised, the Swedish 
defence industry and industrial base must be competitive and it must enjoy 
favourable government policy. IFM has had close relations with the Social 
Democrats (SAP) 15  since the 1930s in order to achieve these and other core 
objectives.16 Concerning weapons manufacturing and exports, IFM as well as their 
political representative, the SAP, often find themselves in an awkward balancing act 
between ideals and interests.  
On the one hand, IFM takes a strong ideals-driven position on weapons 
export controls and supports a restrictive arms trade policy, especially to so-called 
developing countries, such as South Africa, Brazil and India. Swedish trade unions 
have had strong relations with these countries for decades17 but it has also been at 
the forefront of championing Gripen deals with each of these countries. On the other 
hand, IFM actively supports the defence industry because it provides thousands of 
jobs for its members.18 This form of doublethink, i.e. simultaneously protecting and 
representing the interests of their members whilst also championing a restrictive 
arms trade policy has become status quo in Sweden. A former special adviser to the 
Minister of Defence, explains that this form of doublethink is, however, a classic 
case of the pragmatism trumping principle:  
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It is important to understand that IF Metall defend the interests of the defence 
industry because of their own self-interest. They are part of framing the kind 
of hard hawkish faction in the Social Democratic party in terms of defence. 
They are hawkish on defence and they have always been hawkish on 
defence. When it comes to the defence industry, and in particular the Gripen 
programme, it is definitely more about self-interest from their side. It fits 
more clearly into a hawkish narrative where the key is self-interest.19  
Aggregating societal preferences through the political system 
Having considered the most influential societal preferences regarding the 
manufacturing and export of the Gripen, this section discusses the manner in which 
these societal preferences are transmitted to the state. By identifying the nature of 
the practices that shape and guide domestic political representation, one can gain a 
better understanding of how powerful domestic groups or coalitions dominate this 
policy area.   
Revolving door 
It is now common knowledge and even openly discussed in government 
corridors that elites with vested interests in Sweden’s defence industry enjoy a high 
level of mobility between public, private and civil society sectors. A salient example 
is that leaders from IFM regularly move into politics to obtain strategic positions in 
the SAP and vice versa. Members of the SAP and other major political parties also 
frequently secure top positions at SAAB and companies connected to the defence 
industry.20 The same is true for top-ranking military personnel who move into the 
defence industry where they occupy strategic decision-making positions. The 
revolving door policy ensures that there is a circulation of knowledge, ideas and 
interests regarding the development, manufacturing and exports of the Gripen. This 
“epistemic community”21 frequently reinforces the importance of a strong defence 
industry in Sweden as well as the need to uphold the rate of production and exports.22  
Lobbying 
Lobbying has become an essential part of the political system in Sweden vis-
à-vis defence. 23  That said, arms-related lobbying in Sweden differs from the 
conventional ‘American style’ lobbying usually associated with the military-
industrial complex.24 A former special advisor to the Prime Minister provides a 
personal insight into how lobbying functions in Sweden regarding arms 
manufacturing and exports:  
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Lobbying in Sweden is different [from lobbying in the United States of 
America] because it takes place in a very structured environment. Folk och 
Försvar,25 they have this meeting every year where people from politics, 
from industry, from the military forces, from the unions, and even from the 
media meet. This is an area for lobbying to take place. It is not the kind of 
classic lobbying that takes place where people are paid to make a campaign 
or anything, there is no huge amounts of money involved for example. 
People might buy each other a beer or something like that. Money is not the 
driving force here; social structures and social networks are the driving force. 
They talk to each other, they understand each other, and they find common 
ground. This is not only for the armed forces and politicians; it is also for 
industry and unions. These two have a kind of natural role in that social 
universe. By the way, the Gripen’s manufacturing and exports are often front 
and centre during these discussions.26  
Corporatism  
Paradoxically, the Swedish Welfare State – mainly under the reigns of the 
SAP – has made it possible for “substantial involvement of interest groups in the 
policy-making and the implementation of public affairs. In particular, the main 
labour market organisations – trade unions as well as the employer’s organisations” 
have been “major political players in the formation of governmental policy”.27 By 
using the Red/Green alliance (SAP and Green Party) government as an example, a 
senior official at IFM explains how this trade union infiltrates the political structure 
in Sweden to strengthen its representation in the domestic policymaking system and 
how it then influences political decision-making regarding its interests:  
In the current parliament, there are 349 seats. 138 of those seats are Social 
Democrats and Green Party members. The Prime Minister today is a Social 
Democrat but he is also IF Metall’s former president. Almost half of the 
Social Democratic seats are trade unionists. If we look at the leadership in 
the party, three out of the seven of the senior leader group are IF Metall. If 
you look at the extended group of leaders in the party, there are six IF Metall 
members in that leadership group. If it comes to some of the key figures in 
the Social Democratic party over the years, the leaders, and the top positions, 
many of them have come from our trade union. Because IF Metall has so 
much power, we try to use this in different ways. We always try to influence 
the parliament and we always try to have close contacts with individual 
parliamentarians. When it comes to making some kind of a decision, let’s 
say they want to make some change to some kind of Act or policy; they 
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always turn to us. This is also how we put forward our preferences for 
defence-related matters through the parliament and in discussion with the 
government.28 
Despite suggestions that corporatism has declined in Sweden since the end 
of the Cold War,29 it still plays a significant role in defence-related matters. Formal 
institutional changes may have taken place in recent times but the interests and norms 
that underlie socio-political partnerships regarding weapons manufacturing and 
exports are mostly intact. More importantly, instead of being a separate process, 
corporatism has laid the foundation for and is deeply entangled with the revolving 
door and lobbying practices discussed above.  
Policy shifts  
Although the Swedish government accepted an enhanced understanding of 
security after the Cold War, inter alia, the acknowledgement of human security as 
supposed to the narrowly defined military conception thereof, 30  preference has 
nevertheless been given to state-level security, which is expressed most notably 
through the manufacturing and export of conventional war material such as the 
Gripen. The export of the Gripen has essentially become an extended arm of the 
Swedish government’s foreign policy. Based on Sweden’s security doctrine over the 
years, the view is that the Gripen can act as a strategic deterrent to potential 
aggressors in the region and could do the same for those countries that procure these 
planes.31  However, this should be understood in the context of Sweden’s own 
ideational assessment of the role of its armed forces and military equipment 
internationally. As a defence advisor to the government remarks, “we view the 
Gripen as a plane made for peace, not for war”.32 
Armed neutrality 
The concept of neutrality lies at the core of any enquiry into why and how 
Sweden has built up an entire system of security provision both domestically and 
abroad – a system that makes it possible to manufacture and export the Gripen. A 
cornerstone of Sweden’s neutrality was the pragmatic policy regarding self-
sufficiency of armaments that was pursued and which led to the creation of a large 
defence industry (even in an international perspective) 33  and a self-supporting 
military capable of defending the entire Swedish territory.34  
Due to Sweden’s geographic proximity to the Soviet Union, it had to be in a 
position where it could defend itself in case of an attack during the Cold War. In 
such an event, the assault would have to be halted before the attacker reached the 
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border of Sweden. This required forward defence capabilities, which explains why 
Sweden focused most of its efforts to create an advanced air force and navy.35  
Post-neutrality  
Since the end of the Cold War, Sweden has entered into a phase of non-
aligned “post-neutrality” 36  where the previous emphasis on a large conscripted 
territorial defence force has gradually given way to an increasing focus on 
international military operations in collaboration with the United Nations (UN), the 
European Union (EU) or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).37  In 
addition, while Sweden has long been a loyal contributor to traditional ‘Blue Helmet’ 
peacekeeping missions in the past, there has also been an increased political 
willingness recently to commit Swedish military forces to international 
expeditionary operations.38 Evidence of this new, more active stance could be seen 
in the deployment of a Swedish Air Force detachment (using the Gripen) to help 
uphold the no-fly zone over Libya in 2011 as part of Operation Unified Protector. 
This military operation provided the Gripen with a sense of legitimacy in the 
international domain because fighter aircrafts are usually judged by their record of 
accomplishment in conflict situations.39 Before 2011, the Gripen had not been tested 
in combat, and this created some difficulties in justifying its credibility. As Sweden’s 
Defence Research Agency (FOI) explains:  
Most aircrafts that have competed with the Gripen for tender processes since 
the end of the Cold War have been battle-proven. Before 2011, the Gripen 
had never seen any real combat action. But after the Gripen participated in 
operations in Libya, it provided the plane with a stronger marketing profile. 
What this basically comes down to is that it did not allow the Gripen’s 
competitors to do what they have done previously, which was to argue that 
the Gripen has never been combat-proven and that it is only a product that is 
for show. If, in the future, the Gripen is in more serious combat situations 
then that will make an even stronger case for the plane.40 
Cooperation and marketisation  
The need for weapons exports after the Cold War ignited a broad discussion 
in Sweden for how the process of arms supply could be more efficient. 41  The 
government favoured the efficiency of the market, and with market principles 
dictating matters, weapons manufacturing and exports became more 
commercialised. 42  Through a series of government decisions to deregulate and 
denationalise the defence industry, Swedish companies such as Bofors, Hägglunds, 
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Kockums and SAAB were sold whole or in part.43 Internationalisation of this sort 
was acknowledged by the government as being central to defence restructuring in 
Sweden. This was evident in a 1998 government report to parliament regarding 
Swedish exports of military equipment: 
The increasing internationalisation that characterises many sectors of society 
is also evident in the arms area. A rationalisation of the European defence 
industry has begun, involving a considerably greater measure of 
transboundary industrial cooperation in the defence area than has 
traditionally been the case. The reason for this is to be found, inter alia, in 
the end of the Cold War, which has signified a changed threat scenario, and 
in most countries reduced economic frameworks for procurement of military 
equipment. Shrinking resources and substantially rising development costs 
for each new generation of military equipment have given rise to an 
awareness in most European countries with significant arms industries that 
purely national defence industries can no longer be maintained for economic 
reasons.44 
In essence, the end of the Cold War softened the government’s stance vis-à-
vis defence cooperation and it allowed companies such as SAAB to step out of the 
shadows of “secret cooperation”45 and capitalise on the benefits of an unguarded 
interdependence – not only with the West, but also with emerging markets.  
Before the new defence budget was released in 1999, it was also suggested 
that the government take stronger measures to support the conversion of “military 
industries to civilian production”.46 Civil–industrial cooperation was a way out of 
economic and technological constraints. Such a conversion meant, for the most part, 
that the civilian side of the defence industry would manage R&D. The aim was that 
defence-related technologies could be used or converted into products and services 
for civilian use meaning larger returns on government-backed investments. In the 
case of the Gripen programme, cooperation and marketisation have been preferential 
for the Swedish government for three reasons:  
 Cooperation increases deeper understanding for the demands of foreign buyers, 
especially those outside of Europe. It also creates the opportunity to 
manufacture customised versions of the Gripen for foreign buyers. With such 
adaption and variation the plane has become more appealing to potential clients, 
thus making marketing easier.47 This has provided the Gripen with a critical 
edge over many of its competitors, especially the fact that it can be 
manufactured with the capability to carry out flight operations from 




 Cooperating with other defence firms provides companies such as SAAB with 
greater international market access. Exports would not only generate revenue 
and ensure longer production runs; it would also help to preserve important 
competence in the defence industry.49 This is why the 1999 Gripen deal with 
South Africa was so important. Being the first overseas customer to procure the 
plane, South Africa would become a vital testing ground for the Gripen 
programme. As Åke Svensson, former president of SAAB, acknowledged, “the 
success of future negotiations with other countries depends to a degree on the 
performance of the aircraft in South Africa”.50 
 The Gripen programme is the most expensive and largest industrial project ever 
undertaken by Sweden.51 The rapid development of the technology used for the 
Gripen pushed up the R&D content and costs making it increasingly more 
difficult to finance the programme on a national basis. Cooperation with other 
partners significantly brings down the development costs, and as was seen 
elsewhere in Europe, cooperation reduces defence expenditures “by amortizing 
the enormous fixed capital and R&D investments of high-technology weapons 
production over longer production runs”.52  
The state as agenda setter and intermediary 
The state has a dual role to play in terms of maintaining the indigenous 
defence sector that manufactures the Gripen. It does so by being a consumer of the 
produced goods – in other words creating a market for goods – and by being a 
marketing agent for the defence industry.53 In short, without the state as a customer 
and market creator there will be no defence industry in Sweden.54 In the mid-1990s, 
the Swedish government proposed increased support and marketing for defence 
industry products. The 1996 Bill on the Renewal of Swedish Defence clearly 
instructed government officials and agencies to support the export of Swedish arms:  
Tougher competition on the export markets has made it more difficult for 
Swedish companies to grasp export opportunities. It is established in the bill 
that if it is to be possible to utilize the export potential of Swedish companies, 
the government and Swedish authorities must actively and in a structured 
way support the export endeavours of the defence industry to undertake 
major defence matériel projects, on condition that these endeavours are in 
line with the guidelines for exports for military equipment.55  
Davis explains how the government implemented this policy vis-à-vis the Gripen: 
First, a group for defence industry matters and exports of military equipment 
was formed at State Secretary level […] with the aim of promoting exports 
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of military equipment to approved countries. Second, an ambassador was 
appointed within the Ministry of Trade (Handelsdepartementet) as a 
‘marketing supremo’ for major systems such as the Gripen and submarines 
[…] Third, although Swedish embassies were specifically told in the past not 
to play a marketing role, following the appointment of the marketing 
supremo they have now been asked to play a support role and, more 
specifically, have been told to go out and find partners for Swedish projects. 
In many respects the Gripen project is an illustration of this change of 
thinking.56 
Because the state relies heavily on the defence industry to provide arms for 
national defence, jobs, and new technologies, it provides the defence industry with 
a certain measure of economic security.57 As Ingvar Carlsson concluded, the state 
has a vested interest in “preserving the indigenous industrial base that produces the 
Gripen due to national interests”.58 
Political consensus 
In addition to the ostensibly internationalist outlook discussed above, the 
ongoing assessment of the policymaking elite is that Sweden would be politically 
weakened internationally if it did not develop, manufacture and export high-tech 
conventional weapon systems such as fighter jets and submarines. In that sense, the 
policymaking elite are effectively playing to two audiences: the first audience 
represents its popular constituency that has become accustomed to the ideological 
ties their country have to neutrality. The second audience consists of the more 
hawkish elements within the state-military apparatus that views Sweden’s future as 
intrinsically tied up with Europe and its North American allies, and as a regional 
power that needs to be strong militarily.  
Despite widespread moral discomfort with Swedish arms exports,59 there 
has been less resistance against such practices in recent years, particularly in political 
circles. In fact, “since the late 1990s, interests in arms trade critique have been 
dwindling and the number of members in the Swedish parliament with roots in the 
peace movements have been reduced significantly”.60 Political parties have also had 
a large degree of consensus on defence industry matters since the end of the Cold 
War. Among the political parties, the SAP, the conservatives (Moderaterna), the 
Centre Party (Centerpartiet), and the liberals (Folkpartiet) have been ideologically 
aligned in this regard. 61  Such widespread consensus has effectively led to the 




Sweden has basically become a militarised society. Most of the political 
parties, except for the Left Party, are obsessed with weapons. Even those 
politicians that say they are opposed to arms trade ideologically, such as the 
Green Party for example, rationalise the need for the military system we have 
in Sweden. This is particularly true when it comes to the sale of the Gripen.62 
The role of national identity 
Insofar as neutrality and non-alignment have become part of 
“Swedishness”,63 so too has the manufacturing and export of the Gripen. Sweden’s 
ability to market itself successfully as a ‘good partner’ has been a major pull factor 
for potential cooperating partners. The mainstay of this national identity is twofold. 
On the one hand, it is based on Sweden’s perceived idealist-driven foreign policy 
that has been pursued since the 1960s. Such a policy has consisted, amongst other 
things, of – 
 the support of various liberation struggle movements against colonialism and 
apartheid;  
 the use of international organisations, such as the UN, to promote universal 
values;  
 very generous aid and socio-economic development projects in the Global 
South; and  
 the ability to act as a mediator and bridge-builder during conflicts.  
Coupled with Sweden’s progressive domestic policies, these ideals-driven 
factors provide a potent political cocktail for the preference shaping of other 
countries.  
On the other hand, Sweden’s national identity is based on its ability to 
manufacture sophisticated, affordable and reliable products. Swedish companies 
have built an international reputation for producing high-quality goods and services, 
which have been made possible by the country’s large and very successful industrial 
base – one that places a high focus on technological know-how. This has led to a 
situation where Sweden has dominated niche markets for several years, specifically 
in the aeronautics sector – one of its main areas of comparative advantage. Hence, 
Sweden’s defence material is attractive to potential clients because the products 
reflect the technological abilities shown by Swedish engineers and scientists. “This 
is evident in the high number of PhD students working within the 
technical/engineering field, one of the highest per capita ratios in the world”.64 
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Most weapons-exporting nations use their national identity to sell arms in 
one way or another. However, as a White House defence advisor in Washington DC 
remarked:  
Sweden has become very good at using its image to sell weapons, probably 
better than anyone else. Their success lies very much in the fact that buying 
nations usually assume that they are the good guys and everyone else are the 
bad guys.65  
Consequently, Sweden has succeeded to provide an unorthodox alternative 
for potential weapons-trading partners, especially small and emerging powers. 
During the time of great power politics, the world’s hegemons used arms 
exports as either coercive diplomacy66 or to strengthen relationships with regional 
allies.67 Smaller non-neutral nations often had little choice but to align with powerful 
factions for strategic security, political and economic reasons. However, the end of 
the Cold War ushered in a new era where small and emerging powers increasingly 
took control of their own destinies. The IBSA countries (India, Brazil and South 
Africa) have been amongst those that have attempted to pose real alternatives to the 
current world order.68 A major conventional arms deal with Sweden provides these 
regional powers and smaller nations with the potential agency to achieve more 
autonomy and to project their power free from the constraints of the traditional world 
powers. 
Procuring military hardware from a non-aligned country in the post-Cold 
war era means that there is potentially far less political baggage involved than when 
procuring from major weapons-exporting countries. As one Swedish government 
official put it, “security policy implications are often more important than price. If 
you buy from the Americans there are lots of security policy implications.”69 In 
addition to Sweden’s peace dividend, and unlike most other major weapons 
exporters, it also does not have a notable colonial history. Emerging economies in 
the Global South are particularly cautious of military alliances with major powers 
with colonial histories.70  
The assumption is thus that where, how and by whom the product is 
manufactured is just as important as its functionality and price tag. Hence, 
purchasing fighter jets from Sweden does not only fulfil a defence/technical role; it 
also embodies a socio-political constructed meaning. After all, technology is never 
just technology: “every machine has a socially constructed meaning and a socially 
orientated objective […] technological developments can never be fully understood 
or predicted independently of their social context”.71 
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Domestically, the Gripen has become a symbol of national prestige, 
symbolic power, accomplishment and identity. As a former foreign policy advisor 
to the Swedish Prime Minister observed, “our defence industry has become very 
good at making high-tech and niche products, it is part of who we are. Like it or not, 
a product like the Gripen has become part of Sweden’s national identity.” 72 
However, the Gripen seems to occupy a special place in Sweden’s national identity 
inventory. It is one of the few weapon systems with which Swedes comfortably 
identify. The following striking expression by one of the leading Gripen experts in 
Sweden provides a rare insight into this mind-set: 
Politicians are more comfortable with sales in the aeronautics sector because 
it is not problematic. It is much better for our Prime Minister to sell the 
Gripen than selling canons. He does not want to stand in front of a canon and 
look happy. I mean, canons or small arms are a more clear sign of selling 
death. Besides, these things have such a bad reputation internationally. The 
Gripen, on the other hand, is slick, it is sexy, and every boy would love such 
a toy.73 
Masculine-infused rhetoric of this nature is commonplace in discussions on 
the Gripen. Consider, for example, suggestions that the Gripen demonstrates to other 
nations that Sweden is:  
 
 a “great power in the world”;74  
 a “state to be feared”;75  
 a “very able regional power that can defend its own territory”;76  
 a “state that is respected by others because it has the capacity to manufacture 
fighter jets”;77  
 a country that is “important in the world because it has advanced military 
technology”;78  
 and the most recent assumption that the manufacturing and export of the Gripen 
has helped Sweden to have a larger say in the affairs of others and be more 
influential internationally.79  
The abovementioned assertions regarding national identity in the context of 
the Gripen stand in stark contrast to other, more common national identity labels, 
such as “moral hegemon”,80 “moral superpower”,81 or “conscience of the world”.82 
Interestingly, when these same societal and state actors refer to the export of the 
Gripen, they often conflate these two identities. The Gripen deal with South Africa 
illustrates this point rather well.  
One of the main aims of Sweden’s foreign policy towards post-apartheid 
South Africa was to combat inequality and rectify historical injustices.83 Those in 
Sweden who were championing the exports of the Gripen suggested that the deal 
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would be broadly in line with Sweden’s values-driven foreign policy. For example, 
parliament spokesperson for the SAP, Leif Pagrotsky, and SAAB’s former chief 
executive officer (CEO), Jan Närlinge, explained that the deal would benefit poor 
black South Africans 84  and in particular black women who would have the 
opportunity to become South African Air Force pilots and fly the Gripen.85 Similar 
arguments were made in parliamentary debates and the government argued that the 
decision to export the aircraft was in fact ultimately in line with South Africa’s 
broader development goals.86 This case illustrates that, despite the blatant and at 
times puzzling realpolitik utterances illustrated earlier, there remains a strong ideals-
driven thrust in the manufacturing and export of the Gripen. Another salient example 
that stands out in this regard is Sweden’s generous offset agreements and technology 
transfers.87  
Offset agreements require the seller country (Sweden) to reinvest weapons 
sales proceeds in the purchasing country. These so-called ‘offsets’ offer significant 
benefits to developing countries in various ways, the most common being promoting 
and investing in industrial activity. Such agreements also reduce the procurement 
cost of the buying nation.88 By the same token, Sweden is one of the few major 
weapons exporters in the world that have offered to be extensively involved in the 
production and maintenance of procured weapons systems through offering 
extensive technology transfers. Buyers in developing countries see the importance 
of technology transfers as critical to future economic development and prosperity, 
as well as a tangible way to build their own competencies.89 Hence, “technology 
transfers for these countries are often more important than the price of the plane”,90 
as one Swedish government official observed.  
There is a widely held assumption in Sweden by powerful societal and state 
actors that Swedish weapons will serve the buying country, especially those in the 
Global South, better than other more ‘aggressive partners’. This has become a key 
bargaining plank against domestic resistance because these elites argue that weapons 
exports are a vehicle for socio-economic development in buying countries.91 The 
primary logic at play here is that Sweden requires a healthy security infrastructure 
to spread wealth, knowledge and development in regions that require assistance in 
these areas. As one Member of Parliament asserted, “selling the Gripen is a great 
national branding strategy. We do not just sell planes, we sell education and we sell 
other business components that can really help the buying country especially if it is 
a developing economy”.92 
Notwithstanding these ‘noble’ attempts to spread so-called socio-economic 
development, the political and economic importance of supporting indigenous 
military production and the anticipated benefits of arms exports have consequently 
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led to the loose implementation of formal policy. As Goldmann states, “Sweden sells 
arms to support a national weapons industry thought to be essential for maintaining 
the credibility of its neutrality policy; this may seem difficult to reconcile with its 
preaching of peace and disarmament.”93 Yet despite these unambiguous paradoxes 
in Sweden’s nation branding, it continues to attract and seduce potential partners 
successfully based on its ideals-driven national identity. And although these 
paradoxes have not gone unnoticed by Sweden’s cooperating partners, they seem to 
have little, if any, negative effects. As a deputy director at the Department of Trade 
and Industry in South Africa made quite clear:  
Sweden is in South Africa for political and economic reasons, and 
strategically that is quite sound. There is a selfish role or reason in all of this 
of course. The money they spend does after all come from their taxpayers’ 
pockets. In this regard, Sweden is very similar to many other countries. I 
think any government that sells defence products to another country must 
have strategic and political reasons for operating there. That being said, 
Sweden is not as bad as many of the others. And even if Sweden were 
pushing their own agenda, it would not look half as bad as many other 
countries since we in South Africa quite like the way that they tend to do 
things. This has a lot to do with the fact that Sweden does not have a colonial 
history in Africa.94 
It appears that Sweden’s past is shaping its present and possible future for 
Gripen exports. History, as Merle Lipton reminds us, is after all an important part of 
any society’s consciousness. It contributes to the beliefs of the society, shapes its 
understanding about itself and the world, and provides some indication of who its 
friends and enemies are.95  
Conclusion  
This article attempted to provide a deeper understanding of Sweden’s Gripen 
exports by analysing the variation and configuration of societal preferences, policy 
shifts vis-à-vis security and defence, and the role that national identity plays in 
Sweden’s weapons exports. Although the study on which this article reported was 
empirically motivated, in other words, not structured around a specific theory-driven 
analytical framework, it nevertheless spoke to a broader literature on arms trade and 
foreign policy and it highlighted, albeit indirectly, some important conceptual issues.  
From an economic perspective, the article illustrated that certain societal 
actors and the state favour the export of the Gripen since it opens up the possibilities 
for transnational industrial participation, greater market access, increased 
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competence, sustained employment, reduced costs and the posited economic growth 
that comes from trade. This has also allowed for collaborative business ventures 
connected to offsets and technology transfers that the industrial base in Sweden can 
offer. In that sense, a Gripen deal with Sweden is more than just a procurement 
package for military hardware; it is a broad-based business venture that connects 
various interrelated sectors domestically and transnationally. More specifically, it 
provides an entry point for Swedish companies to gain access to other markets 
thereby strengthening and elevating the economic relations with the buying country.  
From a security perspective, the end of the Cold War and the changed 
strategic global conditions provided an opportunity for the Swedish government to 
transform the former security doctrine of that country – based largely on 
independence – and engage more actively in unguarded security and defence 
cooperation with international partners both inside and outside of Europe. In this 
context, the article also showed that defence and security transformation during that 
period was significant for the Gripen programme regarding internationalisation and 
exports. At the same time, the article highlighted the important role that the Swedish 
state has played in creating and maintaining markets for defence firms, such as 
SAAB.  
In addition to these ‘hard aspects’, the article also illustrated that the export 
and acquisition of the Gripen is not merely interest-driven but ideational factors also 
play a central role in these matters. A very clear example of this is the way in which 
different notions of ‘Swedishness’ or Swedish national identity help shape the 
relationship between actors within Sweden and the seductiveness this holds for 
potential buyers of the Gripen. Another good example is Sweden’s technology 
transfers. This generous sharing of knowledge and management assistance is a 
unique feature of Sweden’s weapons exports. In that sense, Sweden has refrained 
from the hard protectionist and zero-sum approach by opting for a more 
internationalist long-term cooperative approach. This also illustrates that Sweden’s 
defence industry is selling more than an aircraft; it is selling an idea – in this case, a 
quintessential liberal idea based on solidarity, cooperation, peace and development, 
and a foundation of moral conviction and progress.  
In conclusion, this study demonstrated that in real-world politics and in 
defence-related matters, there could be a close interaction between interest-driven 
and ideals-driven factors. These two aspects do not always operate in isolation and 
the one often needs the other. Sweden’s ability to balance these two aspects is one 
of its greatest strengths, and it is the awkward yet effective relationship between 
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